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In India, railways are under the control of the government which is the sole provider of 
the infrastructure, operations and regulatory functions. Private participation, though very 
limited, was largely in the domain of infrastructure creation.  
 
In  January  2006,  in  a  landmark  initiative  to  introduce  competition  in  the  container 
operations  segment,  the  Ministry  of Railways  allowed  the  entry  of  private  and  public 
sector operators to obtain licences for running container trains on the Indian Railways 
(IR) network. Until then, the Container Corporation of India, a subsidiary of IR, was the 
monopoly  operator  of  container  trains  in  India.  This  initiative  was  the  first  significant 
move  of  its kind where private  parties  were  allowed  to make entry in  the domain of 
railway operations with direct customer interfacing.  
 
The response  to  the  policy  was  good  and  15  new  entrants  obtained  licences  to run 
container trains. Due to lack of clarity or inconsistency in matters pertaining to haulage 
charges,  maintenance  of  wagons,  transit  guarantees  from  IR  and  terminal  access 
charges, operators started feeling skeptical about the viability of the business. This paper 
examines the current policy environment from the point of view of business viability for 
15 new Container Train Operators and brings out issues related to licensing, pricing, 
terminals, maintenance, and service levels.   
 
Keywords:  Indian Railways, Container Train Operators, Container Corporation of India, 
Policy Issues for Container Transport 
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Container Train Operators In India: Problems and Prospects 
 
Introduction 
Traditionally, railways worldwide have been under the control of the federal government. 
In the past few decades, many developed countries including the US, UK, Japan, and 
European Union have undergone various reforms and even restructuring of their railway 
systems to convert the state owned monopolies into public private partnerships with a 
competitive  environment.  Both  freight  and  passenger  services  in  these  countries  are 
provided by multiple operators. Freight operations, including container, are subject to 
open competition. [Gouvernal and Daydou, 2003; Hafer, 1996; Pittman, 2005; Vassallo 
and Fagan, 2005]. 
 
In  some  other  developing  countries  including  China,  Russia,  Malaysia,  and  India,  all 
freight  and  passenger  operations  are  managed  by  the  government  owned  railways. 
Recognising the potential of container based movement, the railways of these countries 
have segregated the container operations by creating subsidiaries which are the sole 
providers of container rail haulage. [Al-haj, 2003; Baskakov, 2007; Wan and Liu, 2009]. 
India  also  created  the  Container  Corporation  of  India  (CONCOR)  as  a  monopoly 
container train operator (CTO) in 1988. India has moved a step further in 2006 after 
opening up the container rail sector to competition, involving private and public sector 
operators.  
 
In India, railways are government owned and operate under the Ministry of Railways 
(MoR), Government of India. It is a vertically integrated organization controlling its own 
facilities,  performing  all  operating  and  administrative  functions  and  unilaterally 
determining what services to provide. The top management of IR also function as the 
secretaries  of  the  MoR,  thereby  bundling  the  roles  of  licensor,  infrastructure  service 
provider, operator, and regulator.  
 
Historically,  organizational  reforms  in  IR  have  been  towards  the  creation  of 
wholly/partially  owned  subsidiaries  for  specific  operations  (for  example  CONCOR  for 
container  operations),  and  partnerships  with  state  governments  and/or  private  sector 
mainly for infrastructure creation projects (for example construction of new railway lines, 
wagon procurement and wagon manufacturing schemes). These projects did not have 
any element of direct interfacing with the customer. Opening up of the container sector is 
a new era in IR where it has allowed partnership in train operations and consequently 
direct interfacing with the customer.  
 
The policy environment for opening up the sector is described in the next section titled 
‘Background’. The key  components  of  the  container  train  policy  are  described  in  the 
following section ‘The Policy.’ To describe the operations at the time of introducing the 
policy, we discuss ‘CONCOR, The Incumbent.’ The new entrants after the introduction of 
the policy are  described in the section  ‘The  Entrants.’  The  impact made  by the new 
entrants on the industry and CONCOR is discussed in the following section ‘The Impact.’ 
The major problem areas and issues faced by the entrants are brought out in the section 
‘Issues.’  Key  suggestions  with  regard  to  operations  and  regulation  are  made  in  the  
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section ‘Recommendations.’ The last section ‘Conclusion’ proposes some strategies as a 
way forward for the industry.  
Background 
On January 5, 2006, MoR announced its new container train policy wherein it allowed 
private operators to obtain licences for operating container trains on Indian Railways (IR) 
network. The policy was conceived with a view to attracting a greater share of container 
traffic  for  railways  and  for  introducing  competition  in  rail  freight  services.  India’s 
containerized  cargo  was  mostly  export  import  and  the  rail  share  was  only  30%. 
CONCOR, a subsidiary of IR, was the monopoly operator of container trains at the time 
of this announcement. 
 
The Minister of Railways, then Mr Lalu Prasad, in his budget speech on February 26, 
2005, had announced that the MoR and the Government of India would permit private 
operators to run container trains. Two earlier initiatives in 1994 and 2004 to allow private 
operators for container train operations had failed, primarily due to lack of clarity on the 
role of CONCOR vis-à-vis the other operators, and CONCOR’s own resistance. The MR 
now wanted the subject to be studied by a professional agency. Accordingly, RITES, a 
multidisciplinary consultancy organization under the administrative control of MoR, was 
awarded the study in June 2005. RITES submitted its final report in September 2005 
suggesting  guidelines  for  the  policy  [RITES,  2005].  RITES’  recommendations  were 
discussed in various interministerial meetings and issues such as entry barriers for new 
operators, level playing field with CONCOR, and users’ interest were debated by various 
stakeholders before the policy was finalized.  
The Policy  
After many interministerial deliberations involving MoR, Ministry of Shipping, Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, and Planning Commission, the final policy was announced on 
5th  January  2006  by  the  MR  [MoR,  2006].  The  scheme  was  open  to  all  Indian 
companies,  including  subsidiaries  of  foreign  companies  registered  in  India,  having  a 
minimum annual turnover of Rs 1 billion (b) (about US$ 20 million (m)). The validity for 
permission  was  for  20  years,  further  extendable  to  another  10  years,  if  the  CTO 
performed well.  
 
The  entire  network  of  IR  was  classified  and  grouped  into  four  categories  based  on 
existing and anticipated traffic volumes of ports (Table 1). A one time registration fee of 
Rs 500 m (about US$ 10 m) (for category I license) or Rs 100 m (about US$ 2 m) (for 
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Table 1: Licence Categories 
Category  Areas of Operation  Registration Fee 
(Rs m) 
I  JNP/Mumbai Port - National Capital Region rail corridor and 
beyond. This category will also include all domestic traffic.  
500 
(automatically 
includes all four 
categories) 
II 
Rail corridors serving JNP/Mumbai Port and its hinterland in 
other than National Capital Region and beyond. This category 
will also include all domestic traffic except on category I routes. 
100 
III 
Rail corridors serving the ports of Pipavav, Mundra, 
Chennai/Ennore, Vizag and Kochi and their hinterland. This 




Rail corridors serving other ports like Kandla, New Mangalore, 
Tuticorin, Haldia/Kolkata, Paradip and Mormugao and their 
hinterland and all domestic traffic routes. This category will also 
include all domestic traffic except on category I routes. 
100 
 
The rolling stock had to be procured by the operators based on IR approved design. It 
would  have  to  be  inspected  by  IR  as  per  the  rules  in  force.  Locomotives  would  be 
supplied by the IR. For terminal activities, operators were required to either have a rail 
linked Inland Container Depot (ICD) or give an assurance within a period of six months 
of getting approval that they would construct their own ICD within three years or arrange 
to furnish a lease agreement with an existing ICD owner. 
 
Maintenance of track at the terminals would be done by the operators at their own cost, 
with IR being paid for inspection/supervision according to the prescribed prevailing rates. 
Maintenance of rolling stock would  be done  by  IR, for which the prescribed charges 
would be recovered from the operators. 
 
Operators could carry all goods subject to conditions specified in the goods tariff and 
under provision of IR Act and any other instructions issued on the subject by MoR from 
time to time. The operators were given full freedom for setting tariff from their customers. 
Operators had to pay haulage charges to IR for using its infrastructure. IR reserved the 
right to determine haulage charges.  
 
Trains  would  be  dispatched  on  a  nondiscriminatory  ‘first come  first served’  basis.  IR 
would not provide any transit times guarantees.  
 
The process of registration as well as train operations would be uniformly applicable to 
all  including  CONCOR.  The  scheme  would  be  open  for  one  month  in  a  year  for 
registration.  
CONCOR, the Incumbent 
CONCOR, the incumbent container train service provider, was set up in 1988 as a wholly 
owned subsidiary of IR. It had built a strong asset base over the past twenty years. 
CONCOR had 59 terminals, of which 39 were rail linked ICDs in many interior towns, 
serving almost all the regions of India. As of December 31, 2009, it had 218 rakes, 8117 
high speed wagons, and 13,576 (owned and leased) containers. 
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In 2008-09, CONCOR handled 2.31 mTEUs of container traffic, of which, 1.84 mTEUs 
were export import. Its total income was Rs 36,280 m and the net profit was Rs 10,140 
m. CONCOR paid over Rs 1000 m as haulage to IR [CONCOR, 2009]. 
 
CONCOR was also a stakeholder in two container terminals at Indian ports. It joined with 
the container shipping line, Maersk (of Denmark), with a 26% stake to form Gateway 
Terminals India Pvt Ltd to competitively bid for building and operating the third container 
terminal at Jawaharlal Nehru Port. They won the bid in August 2004. In February 2005, 
CONCOR picked up 15% stake in India Gateway Terminal Pvt Ltd, a company floated by 
Dubai  Ports  International,  which  had  already  won  the  bid,  to  set  up  and  operate  an 
international container transshipment terminal at Vallarpadam, under the Cochin Port. 
The Entrants 
The initial response to the policy was good. In the first round of registration (January 16-
February  15,  2006),  14  operators,  including  the  incumbent  CONCOR,  signed  an 
agreement with IR. Ten of these permissions were for category I routes, two for category 
II  and  the  remaining  two  were  for  category  IV.  As  promised  by  MoR,  ‘in  principal 
approval’ to run container trains was given to these 14  operators  before 31st March 
2006. This number was larger than expected, and more so since the Model Concession 
Agreement  (MCA) (which is a precise  policy and  regulatory framework  legalizing the 
agreement between the MoR and operators) was not yet ready. MoR collected Rs 5400 
m as registration fee.  
 
To satisfy the requirement for access to terminals, eight of the 13 CTOs signed MoUs 
with CONCOR for using  its  terminals.  CONCOR  put  a restriction on  CTOs that  they 
should not do business with CONCOR’s existing customers using these terminals.  
 
The following year, in the second round of registration (December 01, 2006 – January 
31, 2007), although 60 companies sent applications, only two, KRIBHCO and Gammon 
India, showed further interest. Finally, KRIBHCO alone signed the agreement with IR for 
category I routes. The enthusiasm had already gone down, showing that the first round 
registrations were more opportunistic. The one year period had given operators a deeper 
insight into the business and a realistic assessment of operational viability.  
 
In the mean time, the MCA was finalized. It broadly reflected the final policy except one 
setback for CTOs. It specified certain  commodities,  which normally moved  in railway 
wagons  in  trainload,  as  restricted/notified  commodities,  implying  that  they  cannot  be 
moved in containers. These were coal, coke, iron ore and minerals (accounting for about 
66% of IR’s traffic by originating tons and 63% by freight revenue). MoR further kept the 
right to change/modify restricted commodities from time to time [PC, 2007]. The MCA 
was signed with operators on 4th January 2007. 
 
In April 2007,  MoR changed the idea of a  limited  one month  registration  period and 
allowed the licence to be bought anytime. Arshiya International, a global supply chain 
services company, got the category I license on April 10, 2008, making the total number 
of operators as 16. Thus, of the 16, 12 got the category I licence, two got category III and 
two category IV. None had sought the category II licence. Most of the companies created  
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subsidiaries to undertake container operations. Table 2 provides a listing of 16 operators, 
their parent companies, other activities of the parent companies, and details of their first 
trips. For the purpose of this paper, the term ‘CTO’ has been used to refer to the15 new 
operators.  
 
Gateway Rail Freight Pvt Ltd was the first private operator to run a container train. They 
flagged off their first train on 3rd May, 2006, using a CONCOR rake. The first privately 
owned container train by a private operator was flagged off by Innovative B2B Logistics 
Solutions on 30th October, 2006. 
 
As of December 2009, of the 16 operators, 13 were operational. Of the remaining three, 
KRIBHCO Infrastructure Ltd had time till January 2010 since it had received its licence in 
2007. Pipavav  Railway  Corporation  Ltd had sought  a one  year  extension  which was 
granted by the MoR. So they had time till January 2010. Reliance Infrastructure, to keep 
the licence, had run one train in collaboration with BLR Logistics in February 2009 by 
leasing a rake from an existing operator. Their regular operations were yet to begin.   
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Table 2: Entrants 
First Trip  S 




Parent Company  Other Activities 
When  From  To 
1  Adani Logistics Ltd  2006  I  Adani Group  Ports, container terminal, 
railways, CFS  9-Nov-07  Patli  Mundra Port 
2  CONCOR   2006  I  IR (Public Sector Undertaking)  Incumbent 
3  Container Rail Road 
Services   2006  I  DP World  Ports, container terminal  5-Oct-07  Dadri  Mundra Port 
4  CWC   2006  I  CWC (Public Sector Undertaking)  Warehousing, CFS  4-Jan-07  Loni  Mumbai Port 
5  Freightstar  2006  I  ETA Star Group (Dubai)  Shipping and port services  23-Nov-07  Loni  JN port 
6  Gateway Rail Freight 
Ltd   2006  I  Gateway Distriparks  CFS  3-May-06  Garhi 
Harsaru  Mundra Port 
7  Hind Terminals   2006  I 
Sharaf Group (UAE) and MSC 
Agency (belonging to Mediterranean 
Shipping Company, Geneva) 
Shipping, freight 
forwarding  16-Apr-07  Nhava 
Sheva  Loni 
8  India Infrastructure and 
Logistics  2006  I 
APL India (subsidiary of NOL, 
Singapore) (76%), and Hindustan 
Infrastructure Project and 
Engineering (24%) 
Container shipping, infra 
entrepreneur  31-May-07  Loni  JN Port 
9  Reliance Infrastructure   2006  I  Reliance (ADAG)  Industry in general  Not avaialble 
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11  Boxtrans (India) 
Logistics Services  2006  III  JM Baxi & Co  Container terminal, CFS, 
stevedoring  12-Apr-07  Kolkata  Loni 
12  Pipavav Railway 
Corporation Ltd (PRCL)  2006  III 
PRCL (A JV between IR and Gujarat 
Pipavav Port Limited, a subsidiary of 
Maersk) 
Ports, railways  Not yet started 
13  TransRail Logistics Ltd  2006  IV  Delhi Assam Roadways  
(Transport and Logistics Company)  Trucking  9-Feb-09  Kolkata  Patli 
14  Innovative B2B 
Logistics Solutions  2006  IV  Bagadiya Shipping, and Bothra 
Brothers (P) Ltd  Agency and entrepreneur  30-Oct-06  West Bengal  Andhra Pradesh 
15  KRIBHCO Infrastructure 
Ltd  2007  I  KRIBHCO  
(Public Sector Undertaking)  Fertilizer industry  Not yet started 
16  Arshiya Rail 
Infrastructure   2008  I  Arshiya International  Logistics, entrepreneur  2-Feb-09  Jharsuguda  Visakhapatnam 
[Source: Compiled from Various Sources]  
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The problems faced by the CTOs in starting operations included delays in delivery of 
wagons due to few wagon manufacturers and shortage of wheelsets,, rakes becoming 
costlier due to hike in steel prices, delays in approvals from IR and other government 
authorities, and shortage of rail linked ICDs. 
 
An analysis of the profile of entrants (Table 3) showed that of the 15 new entrants, 12 
were from private sector, one was a joint venture, and two were public sector entities. A 
further  analysis  based  on  their  ability  to  offer/influence  traffic  showed  that  three 
operators were from the container shipping lines, five were container terminal operators, 
one  was  a  commodity  manufacturer,  two  were  CFS  operators,  and  four  were  from 
service  sectors.  Five  operators  (Hind  Terminals,  India  Infrastructure  and  Logistics, 
Container Rail Road Services, Innovative B2B Logistics Solutions, and Pipavav Railway 
Corporation  Ltd)  were  driven  by  significant  international  interests.  It  is  expected  that 
operators  from  private  sector  who  are  from  container  shipping  lines  and  container 
terminal operators are in a position of advantage to generate traffic.  
 
The Impact 
The investments and achievements by CTOs were remarkable, inspite of the economic 
downturn in 2008 and 2009 which had affected the industry adversely for one and half 
years. CTOs had invested nearly Rs 30,000 m in terminals, rakes, and rake handling 
equipment. Apart from the one time licence fee of Rs 6400 m, they paid Rs 5850 m as 
haulage in 2008-09 to IR.  
 
The data on how much traffic was moved by CTOs in 2008-09 is not readily available in 
the public domain. One approach to determining it would be the difference between what 
the IR reports as total container traffic less the figures reported by CONCOR, both of 
which are available in the public domain. However, it is difficult to make this estimate 
due to the fact that the IR reports the container traffic in tons while CONCOR reports its 
figures in TEUs. We would need to bring both these figures to the same unit.  
 
In an attempt to do this, we analyse the data of 2006-07, prior to the CTOs coming in, 
where  the  container  data  reported  by  IR  would  essentially  be  CONCOR’s  traffic.  IR 
reported the container traffic as 20,406 thousand tons. Of this, 17,470 thousand tons 
was international and 2,936 thousand tons was domestic. In the same year, CONCOR 
reported  its  traffic  as  2,106  thousand  TEUs,  of  which,  1,716  thousand  TEUs  was 
international and 390 thousand TEUs was domestic. From these figures, a tons to TEU 
ratio would work out to be 9.69 for total, 10.18 for international and 7.53 for domestic  
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container traffic. To compare it with traffic data reported major ports, the tons to TEU 
ratio in 2006-07 was 13.25.  
However, it could be inaccurate to use the ratios derived above to estimate the CTOs’ 
traffic  in  2007-08  and  2008-09.  The  CTOs  have  a  higher  proportion  of  business  in 
domestic and possibly a reduced empty movement due to a strong commercial focus.  
We  hypothesise  a  tons  to  TEUs  ratio  of  11  for  2008-09  for  both  international  and 
domestic to convert the IR’s container traffic from tons to TEUs. In 2008-09, IR moved 
30,342  thousand  tons  of  total  container  traffic,  of  which,  23,287  thousand  tons  was 
international and 7,055 thousand tons was domestic. This would yield to 2,758 thousand 
TEUs of total container traffic, of which, 2,117 thousand TEUs would be international 
and 641 thousand TEUs would be domestic. CONCOR reported carrying a total of 2,308 
thousand TEUs, of which 1,855 thousand TEUs was international and  453 thousand 
TEUs was domestic in the same year. Therefore, in 2008-09, total CTOs traffic could be 
estimated as 450 thousand TEUs, of which, 262 thousand TEUs would be international 
and 188 thousand TEUs would be domestic.  
Infrastructure 
As  of  December  31,  2009,  CTOs  had  acquired  93  rakes  and  had  built  12 
ICDs/CFS/logistics parks (Table 4).  
 
Industry analysts predict that over the next five years, CTOs would be operating about 
450  rakes  and  paying  Rs  30,000 m  per  annum to  IR  as  haulage. The sector  would 
employ approximately 3000 people directly and 12,000 indirectly.  
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Table 3: Profile of Entrants 
 
<-------------------------- Increasing level of influence (primary role) 
  Container shipping line  Container terminal  Commodity  CFS operators  Services  Other  Total 
Pvt 
• APL India (India 
Infrastructure and 
Logistics ) 
• MSC Agency (Hind 
Terminals)  
 
• Adani Logistics Ltd (Adani 
Group) 
• DP World (Container Rail 
Road Services) 
• JM Baxi & Co (Boxtrans 
(India) Logistics Services) 






• Arshiya International 
(Arshiya Rail 
Infrastructure) 
• Delhi Assam Roadways 
(TransRail Logistics Ltd) 
• ETA Star Group 
(Freightstar) 
• Bagadiya shipping 







JV  •  Maersk (Pipavav 
Railway Corporation Ltd)            1 




• CWC      2 
Total  3  4  1  2  4  1  15 




Influencing parent companies are listed in this table. Their subsidiaries for container operations are given in the bracket. 
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Table 4: Infrastructure and Operations 
                                                                                                                                                As of December 2009 
  Operator  Rakes  Operating Routes  Operational Rail siding  Planned Rail Sidings 
1  Adani Logistics Ltd  5 
• Patli to Mundra 
• Patli to JNPT 
• Patli to Chennai 
• Kishangarh to Mundra 
• Kishangarh to Chennai 
Patli (Gurgaon), 
Kishangarh (Rajasthan) 
Land acquired for 
more sidings 
2  CONCOR   Incumbent 
3  Container Rail Road 
Services   7 
• Ludhiana to Nhava Sheva 
• Ludhiana to Mundra 
• Faridabad to Nhava Sheva 
Tie up with CFS/ICD 
operators  NA 
4  CWC   - 
• Loni to JNPT 
• Delhi to Mundra 
• Delhi to Chennai 
• Delhi to Vishakapatnam 
• Kandla to Delhi 
Has several ICDs and 
CFS of its own  NA 
5  Freightstar  7 
 Dhapper to JNPT 
 Loni to JNPT 
 ACTL to JNPT 
Tie up with CFS/ICD 
operators  Two owned sidings 
6  Gateway Rail Freight Ltd   18  • Ludhiana to JNPT, Mundra, and Pipavav 
• Kalamboli to JNPT and Mundra 




7  Hind Terminals   10 
• JNPT to Sabarmati, Kota, Ludhiana, Dadri, and Bangalore 
• Mundra to Sabarmati, Kota, Ludhiana, and Dadri 
• JNPT to Jaipur and Nagpur (proposed) 
• Chennai to Bangalore and Hyderabad (proposed) 
Strategic alliance with 
Allcargo and CWC at 
JNPT, Mundra and NCR 
New location In 
strategic alliance with 
Allcargo 
8  India Infrastructure and 
Logistics  9 
• JNPT to Loni 
• JNPT to Patli 
• JNPT to Faridabad 
• Loni to Kalamboli 
Tie up with CFS/ICD 
operators  Panipat 
9  Reliance Infrastructure   -  -  NA  NA 
10  SMART   5 
• Chennai to Patli 
• Chennai to Chattisgarh 
• Chennai to Morvi 
• Raipur to Baruj, Delhi, and Jhatsila 
• Delhi to Hyderabad 
• Chennai to Bangalore 
3 CFS (Chennai, Tuticorin 
and Vizag); tie up with 
CFS/ICD operators and 
private sidings 
More sidings planned  
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11  Boxtrans (India) Logistics 
Services  12 
• Loni to Mundra 
• Loni to Vishakapatnam 
• Lorvi to Kolkata 
• Morvi to Guwahati 
• Delhi to JNPT 
Vizag and Rajasthan; tie 
ups with CFS/ICD 
operators 
5-6 sidings planned 
12  Pipavav Railway 
Corporation Ltd (PRCL)  -  -  NA  NA 
13  TransRail Logistics Ltd  2   Eastern Western corridor  NA  NA 
14  Innovative B2B Logistics 
Solutions  12  • JNPT to Noli 
• South eastern zone to northern zone 
Kalamboli (JNPT); tie ups 
with CFS/ICD operators  3 sidings planned 
15  KRIBHCO Infrastructure 
Ltd  -  -  NA  NA 
16  Arshiya Rail Infrastructure   6  • Jharsuguda to Vishakapatnam  Vizag; tie up with 
CFS/ICD operators  Khurja (NCR), 5 other 
  Total  93       
NA: Not available 
 
[Source: IDFC-SSKI (2009) and Frost and Sullivan (2009)]  
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Operations 
To the credit of CTOs, more commodities moved in containers and new services were 
being  provided  on  routes  where  road  was  a  monopoly.  The  following  examples 
demonstrate this: 
 
•  One  of  the  operators  was  providing  customized  solutions  for  moving  marble  in 
containers  from  Kishangarh  and  Makrana  (both  in  Rajasthan)  to  Kolkata  (West 
Begal). Earlier this traffic was moving entirely by road. Now 60% of marbles on this 
route move in containers. 
•  25% market was captured by CTOs for tiles moving from Morbi (Gujarat) to Eastern 
India. 
•  There was a major shift from road to rail for refrigerated containers from National 
Capital Region to Mumbai. 
•  Arshiya Rail Infrastructure was moving aluminium ingots in customized containers 
from Jharsuguda (Orissa) to Vizag Port. 
•  Adani  Logistics  Ltd  was  transporting  cars  in  specially  designed  containers  for 
carrying automobiles. 
 
CTOs were able to increase rail share on routes even where CONCOR services existed. 
As an example, rail share increased from 28.6% to 37.5% for aggregated movement of 
steel from Rourkela (Orissa) to Ludhiana (Punjab) 
 
This was achieved by providing integrated logistics solutions, reduction in transport cost 
and/or travel time, greater reliability, and customized solutions.  
On CONCOR 
CTOs posed stiff competition to CONCOR, a monopoly service provider for nearly 17 
years, by offering value added services. This was reflected in CONCOR’s market share 
which dropped from 95% in 2007-08 to 76% in 2008-09. In terms of intellectual loss, 
many  of  their  experienced  managers  resigned  from  CONCOR  and  joined  private 
operators.  
 
In a strategic move to retain the market share, CONCOR reduced tariffs for FEU (forty 
foot equivalent unit) containers, dropped rates on selected routes, introduced incentive 
schemes  (volume  discounts,  bulk  discounts,  rebates,  lower  rates  for  moving  empty 
containers, and longer free time for clearing loaded import containers) and formed joint 
ventures  with  companies  to  provide  end  to  end  intermodal  logistics  solutions  to  its 
customers.  
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CONCOR reduced rates by 8% for containers between Ludhiana (Punjab) and ports on 
the  west  coast  after  Hind  Terminals,  and  Container  Rail  Road  Services  started 
operations on this route.  
 
CONCOR entered into several strategic tie ups in the past few years to derive volumes. 
In addition to container terminals at JNPT and Kochi Port, it had tied up with Transport 
Corporation of India to provide door to door services, entered into a 50:50 JV with NYK 
Line  India,  the  local  arm  of  Japan's  Nippon  Yusen  Kabushiki  Kaisha,  to  handle 
automobile  movement  by  rail.  It  was  setting  up  a  cold  storage  chain  for  agriculture 
exports.  It  had  plans  to  set  up  five  logistics  parks  that  would  offer  single  window 
solutions to customers, and was considering entering new businesses such as container 
shipping and air cargo.  
 
Overall, in the face of competition, CONCOR has become more ‘dynamic’ by trying to 
enter into value added businesses.  
Issues 
As per recent industry research, the total Indian freight market in the country was about 
3.1  billion  tons  (bt)  in  2008-09  [IDFC-SSKI,  2009].  This  freight  has  grown  at  a 
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8% between 2006-07 and 2008-09. Of the 
total 3.1 bt, the international cargo was 25%. The rail share was only 30% (850 million 
tons (mt)) despite rail being more economical, faster and environment friendly. 
 
The containerized traffic was about 100 mt during 2008-09. India’s containerized cargo 
is mostly export import. Container cargo has been growing at a CAGR of 15% over the 
past ten years and has a potential to grow even faster given the robust international 
trade growth and increasing container penetration. India’s international trade growth has 
been  over  20%  during  the  past  five  years.  Container  penetration  for  international 
containerizable cargo, which is currently about 68%, is likely to increase to the global 
average of 75-80%. Rail currently carries only 30% of the export import containers to the 
hinterland.  International  container  volumes  for  rail  will  increase  given  the  healthy 
container growth and the increase in rail share due to multiple operators. 
 
India’s domestic container cargo is extremely low, estimated at 20-30 mt. With the entry 
of CTOs, this sector has gained much focus and volumes are likely to grow. 
 
In 2008-09, IR moved 30 mt by container (through CONCOR and CTOs), constituting 
3.65%  of  the  total  rail  traffic.  In  terms  of  net  ton  kms,  it  accounted  for  38  bt  kms, 
constituting  6.90%  of  the  total  net  ton  kms  of  IR.  The  revenue  earned  through  the 
container traffic was Rs 25 b, constituting 4.88% of the total IR’s earnings. Given the 
above growth trends, it appears that the rail container volumes are bound to increase.  
 
However, there are issues that are either unresolved or lack clarity. The business has a 
long gestation period which is further increasing with IR exercising its right to change  
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tariffs and norms from time to time. Since CTOs entered this business, IR has increased 
haulage,  introduced  new  charges,  and  brought  in  restrictions  on  bulk  commodities. 
Some of the CTOs feel insecure as their expenses are higher than revenues, resulting in 
losses. They are also skeptical about IR’s commitments and future policy directions on 
various issues. IR, on the other hand, is affected by a sense of territorial incursion and is 
focusing on protecting IR revenues rather than strategizing on expanding the market.  
 
Based  on  discussions with  a  variety  of  stakeholders  and field  visits, we  identify  and 
discuss  six  issues.  These  are  entry  costs,  pricing  by  IR,  service  levels  by  IR, 
maintenance, terminals and level playing field with CONCOR.  
1. Entry Costs 
With  all  upfront  and  variable  investments,  the  business  has  become  highly  capital 
intensive with a long gestation period for CTOs. They had to pay Rs 500 m/Rs 100 m as 
one time registration fee. It was mandatory for them to build an ICD within three years of 
getting the licence. A medium sized ICD costs anywhere between Rs 750 to 1000 m. 
Initially,  many  CTOs  tied  up  with  CONCOR  for  using  their  ICDs.  CTOs  felt  that  the 
charges by CONCOR were high. CTOs have to procure their own rakes and containers. 
One rake, together with containers costs about Rs 140-150 m. It is estimated that a 
minimum  investment  of  Rs  2000  m  is  required  from  a  CTO  to  start  the  business, 
considering five rakes and one ICD.   
2. Pricing by IR 
The major pricing element is the haulage, a charge that IR levies on CTOs for using its 
tracks, locos, and signaling infrastructure. Other elements are development surcharge, 
parking,  and  stabling  charges.  These  prices  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  CTO’s 
operational costs.  
 
The  haulage  alone  accounts for  70-75%  of  their  operating  costs.  Haulage  has  been 
increased  four  times  since  the  final  policy  in  January  2006,  with  effect  from  (wef) 
November 01, 2006, October 01, 2008, July 01, 2009, and January 01, 2010, with a total 
increase upto 20% (Table 5). Revenues earned through haulage account for only 3% of 
IR’s total revenues. However, for CTOs, it is the most significant cost and any upward 
revision comes as a setback to them.  
 
IR  is considering change  in  haulage  rates for steel,  POL (Petroleum Oil  Lubricants), 
fertilizer, cement, foodgrains and clinker by linking them to freight rates charged by IR 
from its direct customers, with a small discount to CTOs. This would be a departure from 
the principle of charging container haulage irrespective of what is loaded inside. Any 
such change at this stage would have a severe impact on the CTO’s business plans as 
they have made significant investments in procuring special containers. 
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Table 5: Increase in Haulage 
Haulage in 2006 (Rs)  % Increase (2006-10)  Distance 
(kms)  upto 20t  20-26t  above 26t  upto 20t  20-26t  above 
26t 
501  - 550  5874  7172  7871  1.6  12.4  12.7 
1001 - 1050  9734  12222  13556  11.2  14.3  14.5 
1501  - 1550  13796  17267  19236  13.7  16.4  16.8 
2001 - 2050  18089  22304  24908  13.7  18.3  18.5 
2501 - 2550  22405  27362  30600  13.5  19.4  19.5 
3001 - 3050  26720  32391  36265  13.3  20.2  20.3 
[Source: Authors’ Analysis] 
 
Empty container movement is charged at 65% and empty container wagon at 60% of the 
loaded container. On the return, operators do not always get cargo, resulting in lesser 
margins. Reefer containers (for refrigerated goods) generally come empty on the return 
due to lesser possibility of finding similar cargo. 
 
The capacity by weight of an FEU is just about 1.2 times of a TEU. The haulage charged 
by IR for an FEU is 1.8 times of TEU. The FEU hence is viable only for low density 
cargo.  
 
Additionally, IR introduced 2% development surcharge on haulage wef 1st April.2008. 
The parking charges in between runs were increased from Rs 9,000 to Rs 13,000 per 
rake  per  day.  The  economic  downturn  in  2008-09,  shortly  after  operators  got  their 
licences,  forced  many  operators  to  stable  their  rakes  for  want  of  business.  Stabling 
charges at Rs 13,000 per rake per day were introduced. 
 
In January 2007, one year after the policy announcement, while releasing the MCA, the 
IR restricted ores, minerals, coal and coke, accounting for 70% of total rail freight, for 
carrying by containers. The commodity basket for CTOs was thus restricted to just 30% 
of what moves by rail.  
 
All these charges impacted CTOs by adding to their operational costs. 
3. Service Levels by IR  
The  policy  did  not  provide  CTOs  any  service  level  guarantees  from  IR.  CTOs  were 
demanding guaranteed transit time or a fixed time tabled schedule for container trains, 
which IR denied on the ground of network capacity constraints. As of now, IR does not 
have a time table for freight trains. Passenger trains run with a time table and are given 
priority  over  freight  trains.  In  the  absence  of  such  a  guarantee,  CTOs  were  having 
difficulties  in  ensuring  timely  delivery  to  their  customers,  and  managing  their  own 
logistics. CTOs were battling for this since the policy announcement.  
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Finally,  in  December  2009,  nearly  four  years  after  the  policy,  MoR  announced  an 
Assured Transit Time (ATT) service on limited routes. This service aimed at providing 
scheduled container train services to interested CTOs for end to end movements at an 
additional 10% of the haulage charge, called premium ATT service charge. In case of 
non adherence of ATT by IR, the premium would be reimbursed. The reduction in time 
taken in the ATT service against the existing service varies. For the JN Port (Mumbai)-
Tughlakabad  Depot  (Delhi)  stretch,  which  is  a  distance  of  about  1500  km,  the  ATT 
service offers about 15% reduction in time (36-39 hours over the current 42-45 hours). 
For the JNPT-Loni Depot stretch, the reduction is 28-30% (42-43 hours against 60-odd 
hours now) [Business Line (2010)]. 
 
CTOs have yet to start using this service.  There are concerns about the implementation 
modalities and premium being kept at 10%. CTOs are of the view that IR should offer 
discounts on the charges in case of non compliance rather than just reimbursement of 
premium. 
4. Maintenance 
Rake maintenance is only done by the IR at designated facilities. As of December 2009, 
the designated facilities were 21, eight in IR yards, 10 in CONCOR premises, and three 
in CTOs’ premises (one each of Adani Logistics Ltd, Gateway Rail Freight Pvt Ltd and 
CWC). Each rake is assigned a particular facility for examination. It is possible that such 
a facility is away from the main circuit on which a rake is operational and hence the rake 
has to move a long distance to reach the facility.  
 
After examination, a Train Examiner (TXR) issues a certificate to the rakes, valid for 
6000 km or 30 days, whichever is earlier. There may be a scope to increase validity of 
distance beyond 6000 km based on the age of the rolling stock. Most of the rolling stock 
procured by CTOs is new. 
 
At  an  operational  level,  containers  have  to  be  offloaded  from  the  rake  for  TXR 
examination. This results in detention to stock and increased cost of handling.  
 
The train examination is done only by a railway TXR staff. This needs coordination with 
railways. Sometimes the rake is ready but the examination is delayed. CTOs are not 
allowed to hire their own TXR staff.  
5. Terminals 
Terminals are yards where the consolidation of cargo is done. To provide some relief to 
CTOs, till the time they build their own terminal base, IR authorized Zonal Railways to 
notify  one  or  more  railway  owned  terminals  (goods  sheds,  railway  sidings,  unused 
railway lines etc) as a container rail terminal (CRT) depending upon the requirement. 
Though  guidelines  have  been  issued  from  the  MoR,  Zonal  Railways  are  at  times 
resistant in allowing container handling at these CRTs. In the beginning, the usage of  
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these railway terminals turned CRTs was not charged. However, since July 01, 2007, 
the following charges were announced by the IR: 
 
•  Terminal access charges (Rs 34,000 per terminal per rake) 
•  Detention charge (Rs 100 per wagon per hour) 
•  Ground usage charge (Rs 2250-4500 per rake per hour, depending on the type of 
the goods shed) 
 
There  are  innumerable  underutilized/unused  private  rail  sidings  across  the  country. 
These could serve as a strong asset base for the CTOs till the time they develop their 
own  sidings.  However,  these  sidings  need  to  be  redeveloped  for  use  of  container 
handling.  
 
For development of these under utilized and unused terminals and goods sheds, a clear 
vision  is  needed  whether  these  terminals  should  be  developed  as  common  user  or 
captive facilities. In case of a common user facility, who (IR, CTO(s) or owners of private 
sidings) should invest would be a matter of discussion. The owners of the unused private 
sidings  would  hardly  have  interest  in  making  any  investment.  If  CTOs  make  an 
investment, they may prefer to have the facility captive to them or would like to earn 
revenue by providing services to others. IR may invest but since they have a big shelf of 
projects pending already, the willingness and service levels would be questionable.    
 
CTOs are willing to invest in these sidings but there are no clear guidelines from the IR 
on development and use of these private sidings.  
6. Level Playing Field with CONCOR 
Though the policy did provide a level playing field to CTOs with CONCOR, CONCOR is 
still benefiting due to its earlier protection from the IR. While CTOs have to buy land at 
market prices, CONCOR had been provided land at prime locations from the IR at a low 
rate.  CONCOR  still  pays  a  very  nominal  lease  rent  for  this  land.  CTOs  were  not 
extended any support from the IR in procuring land, though IR has a large amount of 
vacant land across the country.  
 
In the absence of their own ICDs, 10 CTOs initially tied up with CONCOR for using its 
terminal infrastructure. Access charges levied by CONCOR for these terminals were felt 
as quite high by CTOs. Although CONCOR’s terminals are built on IR land, IR did not 
exercise any control on this matter.  
 
New entrants have to make payments towards haulage on a transaction basis through a 
demand draft. Getting this draft made at a remote siding is difficult due to not having 
banks in the vicinity, or due to opening hours of the banks etc. CONCOR was paying 
haulage to IR on a fortnightly basis (even with a credit of 15 days). CONCOR is allowed 
to continue with the same practice.  
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Recommendations 
1. Entry Costs 
Inspite of the entry costs, 16 operators entered the market. Potential operators can get 
into agreements with existing operators to minimise capital investments. Hence, issue of 
entry costs may not be significant. 
2. Pricing and 3. Service Levels 
There are two interfaces which are subject to regulation for pricing and service level 
guarantees (i) IR vis-à-vis CTOs and (ii) CTOs vis-à-vis customers.  
 
Between  IR  vis-à-vis  CTOs,  haulage  increase,  service  guarantees,  and  commodity 
restrictions have been the major areas of concerns. There has been no rationale for 
haulage increase. Instead of restricting commodities, IR could have levied a different 
haulage for such commodities. To improve the current pricing, other models could be 
evolved eg revenue sharing between IR and CTOs, route based cost of haulage etc. 
More importantly, these matters need to be overseen by an independent regulator to 
ensure stability and transparency so that CTOs’ interests can also be protected. In the 
absence of such a regulator, IR exercises its control with conflicting interests as licensor, 
regulator, service provider and operator.  
 
Between CTOs vis-à-vis customers, there is already competition among 16 players and 
market forces will ensure fair charges and services for customers.  
4. Maintenance  
There is a need for more number of wagon examination facilities in the country. A vision 
on how these facilities should be developed and operationalized is a policy matter and 
needs  attention.  Though  CTOs  are  currently  allowed  to  establish  facilities  in  their 
premises, the train examination is done only by the railway TXR staff which results in 
delays.  
 
If IR develops the future facilities, it needs to decide on the appropriate numbers and 
locations so that the turn around time of rakes is not very high.  
 
If CTOs invest in facilities, there should be a provision of hiring non IR TXR staff for train 
examination. Training to such staff could be provided by IR and/or other agencies. The 
certification should be done by IR.   
 
Currently, the wagon examination charges are included in the haulage charged by the 
IR. There is a need to unbundle the maintenance charges from the haulage since CTOs’ 
facilities are also being developed. If the examination takes place in the CTOs' premises, 
they should not have to pay the maintenance charge.  
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For greater efficiency and to avoid containers from being unloaded for examination, IR 
should provide pit lines and mechanical testing facilities. 
5. Terminals 
While the greenfield terminal development is more capital intensive due to land prices, 
modernization  of  brownfield  terminals  should  be  given  priority.  Common  user 
development for private sidings would have an advantage over captive since there are 
limited facilities as of now. It is recommended that apart from IR and CTOs, independent 
third party organization(s) should get into professional terminal management business. 
These organizations should take over the existing underutilized private sidings, invest in 
upgradation to enable container handling, and maintain on a regular basis. Any CTO that 
wishes to use these terminals should pay the terminal access charge for each use. This 
model  exists  in  telecom  sector  in  India,  wherein  telephone  towers  are  owned  and 
maintained by organizations other than telephone operators.   
 
For railway owned unused goods sheds, instead of IR developing and maintaining, a 
similar  third  party  approach  is  recommended  for  bringing  in  investment  capital  and 
operational efficiencies.  
6. Level Playing Field with CONCOR 
IR should dilute its ownership in CONCOR, which is currently 63%, for providing a true 
level playing field to CTOs with CONCOR. Due to holding more than 50% stake, IR has 
control  on  the  ownership  and  management  of  CONCOR.  Key  professionals  from  IR 
move to CONCOR on deputation. There are conflicts of interests if IR, the licensor, is 
also an operator in the same business through its subsidiary. 
 
It would also be worth considering a break up of CONCOR into at least two players, so 
that a ‘mighty’ incumbent does not come in the way of the growth of the new players. 
This would be like the breakup of AT&T in the US in the telecom sector. 
CONCLUSIONS 
What Should the Operators Do? 
At this stage when even the survival is difficult for some of the CTOs, they should share 
facilities like rakes and ICDs to minimize investments. For the 15 new CTOs, building 
economies of scale is important for the viability of business. While a few operators have 
reached  a  break  even  mark,  others  are  struggling  to  minimize  losses.  Even  though 
volumes may be there for all the operators to survive, the business has a long gestation 
period and small operators may find it difficult to uphold the losses. In such a situation, it 
would be more sustainable if the 15 new CTOs consolidate into fewer big operators. 
 
CTOs should differentiate services through value propositions by offering (i) first and last 
mile  connectivity,  (ii)  new  routes,  (iii)  door  to  door  solutions,  and  (iv)  customized  
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container solutions. Last but not the least, CTOs can lobby with IR railways to get them 
to change. 
What Should IR Do?  
IR  should  review  its  strategies  towards  the  implementation  of  the  policy  which  was 
conceived with the objective to increase the rail share and introduce competition. The 
objective  has  got  affected  by  a  sense  of  ‘territorial  incursion,’  and  the  focus  has 
expanded to protecting IR revenues. This has resulted in creation of a non conducive 
policy  environment  for  CTOs  where  they  feel  suppressed  by  high  investments  and 
operational costs. IR should facilitate CTOs so that they confidently venture new markets 
and target road volumes. IR should view CTOs as their partners rather than competitors.  
 
There is no top management functioning to give focus to rail based container operations. 
As  an  operator,  the  Railway  Board  Members’  roles  should  be  redefined  towards 
strategizing for key market segments rather than as the current cadre based functional 
supremo.  
 
What Should the Government Do? 
From some of the successful examples from the US and European countries reforms, it 
can  be  learnt  that  unbundling  of  roles,  separation  of  infrastructure  from  services, 
balanced regulation than excessive regulation, non-discriminatory access rights for rail 
infrastructure to all operators, and competitive access to private operators is essential. 
Competitive  access  would  be  characterised  by  the  existence  of  an  integrated 
infrastructure provider, who is required to make rail facilities available to other operators 
on a fair and equal basis. [Cantos and Campos, 2005]. 
 
In the US, the Staggers Act was passed in 1980 which was a move towards a more 
balanced  regulatory  environment  to  replace  the  excessive  regulation  in  the  past.  It 
promoted  competition  and  allowed  rail  operators  and  shipping  lines  to  enter  into 
confidential contracts [AAR, 2009].  
 
The  European  Union,  in  its  reforms  towards  increasing  rail  market  share,  required 
railways in state member countries to be operated commercially like private companies, 
opened  the  freight  market  to  competition,  separated  accounts  for  infrastructure  from 
services,  provided competitive  access  to  private  operators,  and  introduced  a  defined 
policy  for  capacity  allocation  and  infrastructure  charging  [European  Commission 
Directive, 2001]. 
 
In this context, we suggest independent regulation and privatization as the way ahead in 
this sector. Issues related to pricing, service levels, and level playing with CONCOR can 
best be resolved with an independent regulator. In areas related to maintenance and  
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terminals, there is need to explore more options other than IR and CTOs. These areas 
should be privatized and third parties be allowed in the business.  
 
To avoid conflict of interest, it is important to begin immediately with a separation in the 
IR’s  roles  of  licensor,  operator  and  regulator.  The  separation  of  infrastructure  and 
operations can then follow.  
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List of Abbreviations 
 
ATT  Assured Transit Time 
b  billion 
bt  billion ton 
CONCOR  Container Corporation of India 
CRT  Container Rail Terminal 
CTO  Container Train Operator 
FEU  Forty Foot Equivalent Unit 
ICD  Inland Container Depot 
IR  Indian Railways 
m  million 
mt  million ton 
MCA  Model Concession Agreement 
MoR  Ministry of Railways 
POL  Petroleum Oil Lubricants 
PRCL  Pipavav Railway Corporation Ltd 
TEU  Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit 
TXR  Train Examiner 
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